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Summary
Population policy discussions have been influenced by conventional steady-stategrowth theory in which technical progress is exogenous, implying that faster popula-tion growth causes a lower rate of consumption. Making technical progress endogenousin the manner of Verdoorn, Kaldor, Arrow, or Phelps, however, is shown to lead to the
opposite implication, that higher population growth causes a higher rate of growth ofconsumption, though this inference has not been drawn by the authors of these models.Steady-state equilibrium analysis is not appropriate for policy decisions, though,because when a nation chooses one or another population growth rate, it begins- with Ihesame endowment of capital and people and techniques no matter what the population growthrate chosen. Therefore the appropriate analysis is one which compares ?he result oftwo or more growth rates beginning from that initial position.
The paper analyzes the supply and demand of knowledge, and on those considerationsderives the most plausible technical progress functions, which turn out to be mostly
variations on a function of Phelps. The effects of various rates of population growth
are then simulated with these variations specification and parameters
The chief result is that with virtually every variant, faster population growth
shows better consumption results with discount rates up to 5-10%, a level which is farabove the long-run adjusted riskless rate; at higher discount rates lower (or negative)population growth rates have higher present values. If pensions were brought into theanalysis, a la Modigliani, Tobin, and Samuelson, higher population growth rates wouldseem even more beneficial at low discount rates, and would have an advantage over lowerpopulation growth rates at discount rates even higher than 6-10%. And even at veryhigh discount rates, lower population growth rates imply present values only a bit abovetnose tor higher population growth rates. The advantage is overwhelmingly with higherpopulation growth in this growth-theoretic analysis.

3•^
THE PRESENT VALUE OF POPULATION GROWTH IN THE WESTERN WORLD
Julian L. Simon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether additional people are good or bad, from an economic point
of view, depends entirely upon whether people's welfare in only the near
future is taken into account, or whether the long-run future also is
allowed to weigh heavily in the judgment.
It is an advantage of economics over the other social sciences that
with the concept of discounting one can compare offsetting events that
will occur at separate moments, and arrive at a single-valued judgment
about the net value in the present of that stream of future events. But
this powerful tool has not hitherto been put to work in the evaluation
of long-run population growth, a situation where evaluation over time
is particularly crucial.** To put this tool to work, and thereby to ar-
rive at some overall judgments about the social value of population
growth within models that appropriately embody the most important impact
of population growth and size— the effect of a larger population and a
larger market upon technical change—is the aim of this paper. Analysis
of the nature of previous growth models, and of models newly proposed here,
is a conjoint part of the work.
*I benefited from several discussions of the topic with Mark Browning,
and I enjoyed an early talk about this general field with Leonard Mirman.
**Enke's (e.g., 1966) focus is quite different than that of this paper,
being on the evaluation of the present worth of a single person or cohort,
rather than the long run of growth theory. (Also, Enke's work is inter-
nally inconsistent; see Simon, 1969; 1977, Chapter 20).
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The main story may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) At a very
high discount rate—that is, where only the present and near future
matter in the reckoning—any additional people have negative value, be-
cause there are some short-run negative externalities for the "incumbents"
due to (a) transfer payments for social services, and (b) reduction in
per worker output due to capital dilution. The latter is the entire cor-
pus of Maithus ' reasoning, diminishing returns to fixed capital. The
differences are small among population growth rates with respect to both
(a) and (b), however. (2) Conventional growth theory dynamizes the
Malthusian proposition, but the conclusion is straightforwardly the same:
a higher population growth rate implies lower consumption per person under
all circumstances, because more of output must go into investment to main-
tain an equilibrium growth rate; a negative population growth rate is best
of all, all the way to zero births. (3) Any growth model that makes the
amount of technical change a function of absolute population size, market
size, or capital stock will eventually have higher consumption with faster
rather than slower population growth, because of the cumulative nature of
knowledge;* this is also true of most models in which the rate of technical
progress is made a function of the rate of change of capital or output
(but these models are less germane theoretically) . The date at which
consumption becomes higher with faster population growth can be closer
or farther in the future depending on the model and the parameters. (4)
Simulations with a variety of parameters of the various absolute-size
models show that faster population growth almost always has a higher
*Some knowledge grows less useful as it gets older. But it is most
unlikely that knowledge obsolesces enough to matter in this context.
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present value of future consumption at discount rates of below 6-10%;
at higher discount rates, lower (or negative) population growth gener-
ally has a higher present value. This suggests a much higher return to
additional people than the long-run private riskless market rate of
2-3%.
The center of any analysis of the effect of additional people on in-
come through the production of knowledge is this indigestible kernel: No
matter how small the contribution of knowledge of the additional person,
it will someday— though perhaps a long time in the future—inevitably lead
to income per capita being higher than otherwise, ceteris paribus.
There is also a subplot to the story: In a modern society, workers
transfer amounts of income to retired persons that are large in compari-
son to the transfers to children. This means that for any given person
it is beneficial if some other person has more children, ceteris paribus;
this effect raises the discount rate at which the present value of popu-
lation growth is positive above what it otherwise would be with any given
model. This paper concentrates on the main story line, however. Disre-
garded in the calculations are transfers to retired persons and transfers
for child services, as well as negative environmental adjustment costs,
positive environmental externalities of all sorts (especially those that
decrease the entropy of the earth) , and changes in work and savings
patterns due to larger numbers of dependents.
The paper focuses on the more-developed world (MDC's) as a whole (the
West plus Japan and Oceania), in which technological change is created as
well as adopted from elsewhere: with the passage of time, the poorer part
of the world will also contribute heavily to the rest of the world's tech-
nical level, however, as well as simply being mostly a recipient as at
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present. Consideration of the MDC's as a whole also sidesteps a possible
coat-tails strategy for any individual country.
II. TEE THEORY OF SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND THE
APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL CHANGE FUNCTION
Though this section will end still a long way from a satisfactory
theory, or theory-based model, of technical change as part of the growth
process, it is worthwhile to at least put the matter in a general theoret-
ical context.
Though economists generally begin analyses with the forces of supply
and demand, it has not been so with technical change in the context of
growth models. Previous endogenous technical-change models have worked
only with investment as a variable. And though capital investment that
embodies technical change may be seen as a carrier of new techniques,
it is identified with neither supply nor demand. (Of course cumulative
capital may also be viewed as an empirical proxy for total output a la
Arrow, 1962.)
Notation
S = supply of new knowledge and technical advance
L = population (= labor force in this context)
s = saving rate, as a proportion of output
n = rate of growth of labor force
Y = total output
K = stock of capital
Y
v = — = reciprocal of capital-output ratio
w = the wage rate
r = rate of return on capital
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M = the level of labor-augmented technology, which may be
thought of as productivity per worker
E = disequilibrium gap in capital-output ratio
z = adjustment factor in savings function
a,b ,c,e,a,B,Y,A,<J, ,l', = constant
The Supply Side
The supply of technical changes is relatively easy to analyse. Sup-
ply clearly depends on the number of persons, trained or untrained tech-
nically, available to produce or adapt new ideas; this is the labor force,
L.*
The supply of technical change also depends upon the level of edu-
cation and training of the labor force, both the amount of specific train-
ing (which could be indexed by the supply of scientists and engineers)
and the unspecific general education (which can be indexed by the mean
education of the society) that leads to such important innovations as
new organizations. Because of the close relationship between per capita
*This proposition—that, ceteris paribus, more people mean more
inventions, technical change, and productivity increase—seems as self-
evident to me as any economic proposition can be. It is also so ob-
vious to Machlup that he handles it in twelve words: "the supply of
labor— the chief input for the production of inventions." (1962, p. 143).
Kuznets, and Petty long before him, asserted the same idea without thought
of contradiction.
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income and mean education, the general level of education may also be
Y
indexed by -per capita income, —
•
L
Though scientific knowledge is not, by any means, the same as tech-
nical change, it is a key precursor of it—both "spontaneous" and "induced"
technical change. It is therefore relevant and important that in a cross-
section of countries, population size and per capita income together are
an excellent explanation of the amount of scientific activity (Price 1967,
1971, 1975; Love and Pashute, 1978).
The production of new knowledge requires the existence of a stock
of knowledge. Hence the quantity of existing knowledge, both in storage
in libraries and in action in the level of technical practice in the
economy, constrains the amount of new knowledge that can be created at
any moment by various numbers of persons. This implies diminishing re-
turns to the fixed stock of knowledge at any moment.* (This effect is
not seen in a cross-national analysis because all countries have roughly
the same access to the existing body of knowledge.) Therefore an appro-
priate technical change function should contain an argument for the
existing stock of knowledge.
The total number and variety of physical stimuli—objects and pro-
cesses—that exist in a society at a given moment must also influence the
supply of inventions, as the weather influences crops. Per capita income
*Kuznets (1960, p. 328) does not accept that returns must dimi-
nish even in a static sense, because "creative effort flourishes in a
dense intellectual atmosphere, and it is hardly an accident that the
loccus of intellectual progress (including that of the arts) has been
preponderantly in the larger cities." Higgs (1971) and Kelley (1972)
find some statistical verification for this point.
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is one measure of this factor, but total income Y is likely to be another.
This jibes with Verdooro's Law, which makes the change in productivity a
function of change in income, and with Clark's data (1967, on p. 265)
which implicitly makes the level of productivity a function of total
income. It also fits the learning-by-doing data.*
Within a given economy, the supply of inventors and inventions
clearly is a function of the returns in profits to the firm and payments
to investors; some poets and mathematicians will temporarily turn their
fine minds to productivity increases (or to pornographic novels) if the
prize offered is large enough.** And more prosaically, some persons now
working at non-R&D jobs—say, engineers out on the road selling existing
products, and technicians working on existing electronic equipment—will
move to R&D jobs and departments as the wage rises in R&D. This effect
is mostly not relevant to a study of the effect of different rates of
population growth upon the rate of invention. A related idea will be
explored, however, in the section on the demand side.
The supply function may therefore be written
(1) . S = f(L, Y, f, M)
*One may wonder how the studies showing that the rate of learning
declines with output (e.g., Barkai and Levhari, 1973; Levhari and
Sheshinski, 1973, Baloff, 1966, and references cited therein) fit in
here. The rate of learning in a given product situation may decrease,
but there may still be changes in the processes which restart a high-
rate learning process, and increase the overall rate of learning which
is consistent with the envelope curve in Figure 1.
**Machlup (1962) makes this point well.
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If one assumes that the mean level of education increases the average
individual's knowledge-producing capacity, though not linearly, and if
we notice that population size multiplied by per capita income equals
total output, we can write a more explicit supply function
(2) S = faVb with y < 1 and A < 1.
It is important to notice that there need not be diminishing re-
turns over time to additional people, because the stock of knowledge
with which people may combine their creative talents grows with time.
And I believe the argument is strong that returns will increase.
Kuznets makes an argument for increasing returns on two grounds: (1)
the stimulative effect of dense environment mentioned earlier, and (2)
"interdependence of knowledge of the various parts of the world in
which we human beings operate" (p. 328); e.g., discoveries in physics
stimulate discoveries in biology, and vice versa. Kuznets discounts the
possibility of diminishing returns because "the universe is far too vast
relative to the size of our planet and what we know about it" (p. 329).
Machlup suggests that "every new invention furnishes a new idea for
potential combination with vast numbers of existing ideas... [and] the
number of possible combinations increases geometrically with the number
of elements at hand" (1962, p. 156). It is this latter idea of an in-
creasing number of possible permutations of the available elements of
knowledge as the stock increases, when combined with the idea of a re-
duced likelihood of duplicate discoveries as the number of possibilities
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increases faster than the number of potential knowledge producers, that
seems most compelling to me.*
The Demand Side
The demand for improvements in productivity that will cut costs
clearly depends upon the scale of the industry in which the improve-
ments can be put to work. We observe more total R&D in large indus-
tries than in small ones, and it is reasonable to expect that a larger
country will have more total R&D than a small one, in part because of
the greater scope of utilization of improvements; this is confirmed by
the Price and Love-Pashute data mentioned earlier.
It may be illuminating to consider an example of how demand for
R&D rises as overall demand is expected to rise from additional persons.
Imagine that your firm considers producing a new sort of reading- talking
computer for the blind. Right now your financial projections are just
below the break-even point. If you are suddenly informed that the popu-
lation of potential users in 2, 4, 8 and 16 years from now will be 50%
larger than you had entered into your calculations, your present-value
computation will now be positive (on any reasonable assumptions about
potential competitive behavior). You will now have a greater demand
for R&D workers.
With respect to investment and productive equipment, the effective
demand for new improvements is an accellerator function; if output is
*I am presently building a micro model of the inventive process
based on these processes, and I hope to be able to make more conclusive
statements about this matter.
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stable and can be supplied by existing plant and equipment, there will
be little demand for the improvements that can only come with new invest-
ment. (But the Eorndal effect makes clear that productivity change occurs
even without the installation of new equipment; see Arrow, 1962, and David,
1975)
.
Taken together, then, the demand for economic improvement may be
seen as a function of total output, change in output, and per capita
income (or per capita output)
(3) D = f(Y, Y, I).
There is another facet of the demand side that is harder to fit
with conventional economic thinking, because it requires the concepts
of needs and aspirations. The concept of need is a subjective rather
than objective idea, but felt need certainly can stimulate innovative
activity. "Necessity is the mother of invention"—few would be so rigid
in their adherence to traditional economic categories as to deny all
meaning to this notation. Implicit in this idea is that at a given
moment there is a gap between the individual's rate of output, or stock
of inputs, such that the individual has a greater-than-otherwise motiva-
tion to find a new idea to increase the effective stock of inputs, or
the manner in which the inputs can be combined, so as to increase the
rate of output. Finding and developing such a new idea may require
additional labor time on the part of the individual, and/or additional
"effort," whatever the meaning of the latter term.
Surely this is the process that occurs in wartime or in economic
downturn or in other emergency, as a host of anecdotes show. I know
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of no statistical evidence linking innovation and level of "need." But
there is ample evidence, both across nations at present, and within na-
tions over tine, that lower actual average income or wages leads to more
hours worked per week. There is also an observed relationship between
number of children and number of work hours. (See Simon, 1977, Chap. 4,
and Lindert, 1978, App. B) . These phenomena can be understood with the
tradeoff between income and leisure described for us by Hicks (1932) and
in more detail for the peasant farmer by Chayanov (1925/1966). It seems
reasonable that there should be a similar tradeoff between income aspir-
ations, and leisure (in the sense of a respite from the sort of effort
required to create and develop new innovations). The smaller the home-
maker's budget, the more ingenious one would expect her or him to be in
inventing ways to pad the hamburger with cheaper filler; and the smaller
the home, the more ideas for utilizing the space efficiently that you
would expect from the homemaker. (The ingenuity of sailors in utilizing
every nook and cranny on submarines and other small navy ships is a
marvel)
.
It is also reasonable to extend this line of thought from need and
actual income to income aspirations—an effect, however, that runs in
the opposite direction from actual income. The higher one's actual past
income, the higher is one's wealth and the lower is one's objective need
for present income. But the higher one's actual past income, the higher
one's aspirations for present income. It would be possible to study the
effect of aspirations econometrically by using the actual income in a
given year, or the income that the trend of past income would lead one
to expect, as an independent proxy variable.
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III. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE GROWTH MODEL FOR
THE UNDERSTANDING OF POPULATION GROWTH?
Critical AssessEent of Existing Models
A brief review is necessary to set the scene. Malthus is the fount,
and in his theoretical system an additional person has a straightforward
negative effect on the income of others due to capital dilution and
diminishing returns: more workers on the same acres mean less output
per worker.
In the simplest Harrod-Domar growth model there is no technological
change at all. And the result is much the same as that of Malthus, and
for the same reason: with more people, more investment is necessary to
maintain the same levels of capital and of output per person, which
implies lower consumption per person. Growth theory that introduces
constant exogenous technological change leads directly to the same con-
clusion: faster population growth implies lower consumption.
The main corpus of growth theory with respect to population growth
can fairly be summarized as a no-complications dynamization of Malthus'
capital dilution with a simple conclusion: more people imply lower
income.* You may check the accuracy of this survey in works on popula-
tion growth by Phelps (1972) or Pitchford (1974) , as well as in such
general studies of growth as Solow (1970), Brems (1973) and Dixit (1976).
Furthermore, it is amply clear that this main stream of growth
theory has had influence on the policies of nations and on public opinion;
the former is well-documented in Piotrow (1973).
*The following paragraphs draw upon a companion paper (Simon, 1979)
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But a powerful empirical fact enters here : Models implying that
population growth is negatively associated with economic growth are
falsified by the data for the past century and half century for those
western-style countries for whom Kuznets could find data, as well as
the cross-sectional data on economic growth since World War II (for a
summary see Simon, Chapter 4). This fact means that the models without
endogeneous technical change are without value for the understanding
of population growth's effects.
It is reasonably easy to show that in a comparison of two populations
with different rates of labor-force growth (with optimum savings ratios)
that are already on the equilibrium growth path, faster labor- force growth
implies higher consumption—as long as technical progress is a function
of the size of the labor force on total output, even to the slightest
degree . Consider a situation in which technical progress does not de-
pend upon either labor force or total output; if so, technical progress
will be the same, and the rate of growth of per-capita output wil also
be the same , for every rate of population (labor force) growth, though
consumption will be lower with higher population growth due to the higher
warranted savings rate. But if technical progress is faster with a higher
population growth rate—as it is with function (6a) Decause faster popu-
lation growth impies faster increase in aggregate income and hence in
capita—then the rate of growth of per capita output must be faster
with higher population growth. And this must therefore eventually (no
matter how slight the dependence of technical progress on population
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or output) lead to higher levels of per capita output and consumption.
This is the argument in a nutshell.*
Before we begin to examine possible technical progress functions,
we must consider which facts—stylized or otherwise~we wish the function
to fit. The most important fact is that technical progress has been at
least proportional to population size throughout human history; when popu-
lation was very small 10,000 or 20,000 years ago, the amount and the rate
of technical progress was small compared to later periods when population
(as well as the stock of knowledge) was larger. And there is no persuasive
reason to expect this to change in the future. There are at least some
writers on the physical sciences (see Rescher, 1978 and citations therein)
who argue that a given quantity of resources brings decreasing amounts of
knowledge as time progresses. Whether or not this is true for the
physical sciences—and there are vast and perhaps insuperable problems
in comparing the value of different discoveries as well as strong phil-
osophical arguments against as well as for this position— this parti-
cular trend simply does not find analogy in the rate of technical pro-
gress as measured by various proxies for national income. And even if
there is a limit to the number of "laws" that can be be discovered in
the physical sciences, there is certainly no such limit in the social
and economic sciences, because increasing institutional complexity
*The comparison of golden-age growth paths is not the relevant comparison
for a given society's policy choice at a given moment, however. Rather,
the society wishes to evaluate its future streams of costs and benefits
with different rates of population growth, given its present endowment
of capital and level of income. That comparison is the subject of
another paper.
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creates new material for study and understanding. Therefore it seems
reasonable that the rate of change of technical progress should be at
least proportional to the size of population, the stock of knowledge,
the size of GNP, the stock of capital, and so on.
There remains the question whether the rate of technological pro-
gress should be greater than the rate of growth of population. Solow
(1957) calculated that the yearly rate of change of the technological
coefficient in his model went from 1% to 2% over the 20 years from the
(median of the) first half of his study period to the (median of the)
second half of his period (1909-1949) . Fellner computed rates of
growth of productivity of 1.8% for 1900-1929; 2.3% for 1919-1948; and
2.8% for 1948-1966 (1970, pp. 11-12) . And the Kendrick-NBER data show
that the rate of growth of output per unit of labor input rose .012%
per year from 1890 to 1957, which means a rise from 1.62% yearly at the
starting point to 2.38% yearly at the endpoint.*
*0ne might object that the period covered by these U.S. data is
only a small segment of history. But this segment is all we have that
is quantitatively measured—and it is the same segment used when
writers on growth cite data on capital -output ratios. As to a drop in .
the most recent years, it is very seldom sensible to read changes in
long-run secular trends from a few years' data; doing so has produced
more wrong predictions than any other single bad practice in social
science (e.g., the predictions of shortages and scarcities starting
in 1973). Furthermore, Denison's close examination of the recent
data persuade him that "lack of advances in knowledge was not respon-
sible for most of the drop" in the growth rate of national income per
person employed since 1974 (1978, p. 12). The entrance of less-skilled
and less-experienced persons during a period of rapid growth of the
kind here has been important, as have a shift to services and the need
to invest in environmental and health protective advances which do not
appear in GNP and productivity figures. Considered by itself, manufac-
turing has been making "a good advance" (Federal Reserve Bank, 1979,
p. 7).
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Some growth theorists however have made the amount of technological
change endogenous.* Kaldor (1957, and later a bit differently with
Mrrlees, 1962) was impressed by "Verdoorn's Law" relating technical
change to change in output, and he modeled changes in productivity as
a function of investment:
M
t '
M
t-1
K
t "
K
t-1
(4) _i E_JL = f JE b-LM K
t-1 *t-l
But this function - like all other functions that work with changes in
levels, rather than with the absolute quantities themselves - has zero
technical change when the labor force is constant, which is falsified by
the Horndal data and all everyday observation.
Alchian took note of the fact that production of such products as
airframes improves in the course of production. He then introduced this
"learning-by-doing" insight into economic theory, distinguishing among
various sorts of economies of scale (1949/1963; 1959). Arrow (1962)
then built an explicit technical-progress function upon this foundation,
and—unlike Kaldor—went over to cumulative investment as the carrier
(or the proxy for the carrier) of embodied technical progress:
(5) M
t
= cKj
where
<f>
is a constant comparable to the coefficient of serial numbers
in learning-by-doing studies, and is of the order of .2. But Arrow's
function is not fundamentally different than is Kaldor' s, as we see by
writing from (5)
*I exclude from consideration the body of literature concerning
the direction of technical change as an endogenous matter, e.g. von
Weiszacker (1966), and Nordhaus (1969).
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(5a ) —- = -
t"1
-
cK
t-l
and comparing to equation A.* Furthermore, Arrow's function is really
not a good transcription of the learning-by-doing idea; a more realistic
rendering will be discussed below.
Phelps (1966) suggested a most interesting model which (approximately)
reduces to
M
r
- M /L. \
where h is a concave function. The functions explored in the next section
are similar to Phelps' function, though developed from different arguments.
Hence I shall not discuss Phelps' function further at this point.
In previous work (1977, Chapter 6) I made the rate of change of
technology a function of, alternatively, the labor force, and total output
(7)
^T1 " aY*- 1 *
'
l
and
(8) ' SlU hl* *<1.
t-1
*Eltis (1973) and Shell (1966) have discussed other variants of
Kaldor's function.
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I do not any longer feel that there is evidence supporting a function
that is so sensitive as to yield an increasing rate of growth of knowledge
in response to a steady rate of growth of population.
The difference of degree between my function (8) and Phelps'
formulation (6) is a matter of the size of the impact of existing M.
This may be seen by writing both functions in Cobb-Douglas production
function format
(6a) M - M , = M'
5
,
L*
5
,,
t t-1 t-1 t-1'
where the exponents come from the rest of Phelps' discussion, and
(8a) M - M = M L*, .1 <_ $ ± .5.
Phelps' function, homogeneous of degree one, yields steady-state growth
(including a constant rate of change of M) whereas my (8a) yields an
increasing rate of change of M.
From here on the dependent variable on the left hand side will be
written as the absolute quantity of change in the technical level, rather
than the rate of change, an alteration I consider important. The latter
is a more basic and more illuminating way to view the matter. This can
be seen merely as a matter of algebra, i.e., re-arrangement , but the
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reader's interpretation may well be affected by the way the algebra
is written.**
**Leontief argues strongly that different algebraic modes of expression
of a proposition have importantly different psychological effects on the
scientific reader:
[I]n the actual process of scientific investigation, which
consists in its larger part of more or less successful
attempts to overcome our own intellectual inertia, the
problem of proper arrangement of formal analytical tools
acquires fundamental importance.
... The degree of mental resistance which accompanies
the use of one or another formal pattern is furthermore
rather closely (although also only "statistically") and
positively correlated with the chance of committing logical
mistakes. Mistakes of this kind may manifest themselves
either in the inability to perceive the "evidence" of a
correct argument or in the practically much more dangerous
readiness to be convinced by a false one. (Leontief, 1966,
pp. 59-60)
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IV. A MORE COMPLETE AND APPROPRIATE MODEL
Section II discussed the general theory of the relationship of popu-
lation to the technical change function. Now after the critical review
in Section III we are in position to start from scratch and discuss in
greater detail which model should be considered appropriate for simulating
the effect of various rates of population growth.
The supply-side theory suggests rather straightforwardly that L
and M are key arguments. The demand-side theory suggests Y as the
Y Y Yfundamental factor, along with—, AY, and [(t0._ - (7" )]• For
L L t L
(
._ 1
simplicity, however, we shall not include the latter two arguments in
the present work, though later work should study whether their inclusion
affects the results.
It is reasonable to assume that the arguments interact in a multi-
plicative fashion, with each of the factors subject to diminishing returns.
Expressing for clarity's sake the left-hand-side as the absolute amount
of advance (rather than the rate of change) in a given period, the
general function is then
(10) M
c
- M^ - a 1^ M^CI)* I*.
Runs were made with a variety of parameters, adding alternatively to less
than unity, unity, and more than unity; L and M are given much larger ex-
ponents than (i) and Y in most cases. I also ran a variety of functions
y
without one, two, or three of the arguments in equation 7 (noting that —
can be reduced to Y and L when both the latter are also in the equation).
The rest of the simulation is as simple as possible: A Cobb-Douglas
production function with technological progress introduced (for clearest
understanding) as a multiplier of labor
-21-
(11) Y t =-k
a (M
t
L
t)
e
.
and
the savings function either
(12) Kt = Kt_± + sY
or the following set of equations
(13) K
t
= K
t_1
+ sY + zY
(14 ) E - *&=k - BC^ )K
t-1
K
t=0
(15) z = [sign of E] [l-e"
4 * 2 ' E l]
which makes saving a function of .the difference between the original
output/capital ratio and the current output/capital ratio.
I have then simulated the effects of various parameters and
various rates of growth _d of the labor force
(16) L t = L t_1
+ dL
t_1 ,
d = -1%, 0%, 1%, 2%
The following combinations of savings rates and rates of growth of
the labor force provide most of the desired comparisons: L = 1%,
s = 2%; L = 1%, s = 4%; L = 2%, s = 4%.
RESULTS
Procedure
The results of various simulation runs are shown in Table 2.
The results are present-value calculations of the stream of consump-
tion at different discount rates. An example of the underlying data,
-22-
year by year for ten years, and then at ten and fifty year intervals
is shown in Table 1.
Tables 1 and 2
Present values were calculated at the end of 300 years, at which
time the present value has virtually ceased to grow with the addition
of more periods, except at a zero discount rate. For those runs in
which the computer ceased functioning short of 300 years due to some
magnitude in the simulation becoming too large (usually M, though
sometimes C)
,
present values were computed for all L at the highest
of 250, or 200, or 150 years for which the calculations are complete.
For some runs in which it was interesting to look for convergences and
golden-age paths, the model was run for 600 years (data not shown here).
Findings
The general picture for any particular model is that the yearly
consumption level starts out lower with a higher population growth rate
than with a lower population growth rate, but becomes higher somewhere
around the twenty-fifth year after the entry of the additional persons
into the labor force, on the average. This is the same picture that
emerged in previous works (Simon, 1977, Chap. 6).
For purposes of decision about population policy, however, we must
know the trade-off between present and future consumption, just as when
making decisions about dams, environments, monuments, and other matters
that have very-long-run ramifications. An appropriate manner to think
about this problem is to examine the present values of the alternatives
at a discount rate deemed reasonable, and select that alternative that
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TABLE 2
PV
t=300
for the Equation
A & « 74
«t -
K
t-i - *UK-iVWl-i
WvJV>
Discount Rate
1.1
1.2
1.2
,5 .5 NA NA
ii it it i
ii ii ii i
2.1 .3 .3 NA NA
2.2 ti it tt ii
2.3 n it it it
3.1 .7 .7 NA NA
3.2 it it it tt
3.3 tt it it ii
4.1 .9 .9 NA NA
4.2 it it it it
4.3 ii ii it ti
5.1 .5 .9 NA NA
5.2 ii it it it
5.3 it it it
6.1 .4 .6 NA NA
6.2 it it it it
6.3 ii ii tt it
7.1 .6 .4 NA NA
7.2 it ti ti ii
7.3 ti ii ti it
8.1 .5 1 .0 NA NA
8.2 ii it it it
8.2 ii ii tt ti
9.1 .5 1 .1 NA NA
9.2 ii ii it "
9.3 ii it it t
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
696
2,110
917
451
666
585
1,740
4,800
+E1
2,350
3,700
+E1
6,580
+E7
5,190
+E1
2,360
1,300
+E5
3,190
696
1,790
917
696
2,420
917
6,170
5,500
8,430
1,140
1,080
+E10
1,570
39.2
52.3
45.1
35.6
38.8
40.5
48.5
261
57.5
193
1,740
+E5
256
51.8
514.
62.0
39.2
49.6
45.1
39.2
55.0
45.1
69.6
1,470
86.4
397
6,980
+E7
538
14.9
15.4
15.8
14.6
14.7
15.5
15.3
17.7
16.4
16.7
4,180
+E3
18.2
15.4
18.2
16.5
14.9
15.3
15.8
14.9
15.5
15.8
15.6
375
16.8
16.9
4,070
+E5
18.5
9.20
9.20
9.52
9.13
9.07
9.44
9.29
9.41
9.62
9.42
9.26
9.77
9.30
9.36
9.63
9.20
9.18
9.52
9.20
9.22
9.52
9.33
10.2
9.66
9.36
2,130
+E3
9.71
6.67
6.61
6.81
6.65
6.57
6.78
6.70
6.67
6.84
6.74
8.65
6.88
6.70
6.66
6.84
6.67
6.60
6.81
6.67
6.62
6.81
6.71
6.67
6.85
6.72
9,950
6.86
10%
5.24
5.17
5.30
5.23
5.15
5.29
5.25
5.20
5.31
5.27
5.23
5.33
5.25
5.19
5.31
5.24
5.17
5.30
5.24
5.18
5.30
5.26
5.19
5.32
5.26
466
5.32
10.
1
.5 .5 NA .5
10.2 " " " "
10.3 " " " "
11.1 .5 .48 NA NA
ii i n ii it ii
11.3 " " " "
12.1 .8 .5 NA NA
12.2 " " " "
12.3 " " " "
13.1 .5 .5 .5 NA
1 O 1 II II II 11
13.3 it it it it
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
1% 2%
2% 4%
1% 4%
3,970
+E2
2,310
+E26
2,230
+E3
1,710
+E2
5,510
+E17
7,460
+E2
3,090
+E4
2,000
+E35
2,460
+E5
2,710
1,230
+E3
5,980
1,270 20.1 9.45 6.75
5,470
+E23
6,560
607
1,330
+E15
2,370
8,390
+E1
4,740
+E32
6,560
+E2
52.8
3,680
76.1
1,140 2,090 3,360 4,680
+E21 +E18 +E15 +E12
36.6 9.92 6.91 5.34
18.1
15.3
27.0
16.7
9.43 6.74
227 10.1
9.28
9.38
6.70
6.65
5.27
2,830 5,310 8,720 1,250
+E11 +E9 +E6 +E4
25.2 9.87 6.90 5.34
6.78 5.28
9,900 1,820 2,920 4,070
+E29 +E27 +E24 +E21
1,610 13.6 6.95 5.35
9.66 6.85
5.25
5.19
5.32
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has the highest present value. The present values for the L alterna-
tives in the various models, with various parameters, are therefore set
forth at a range of discount factors that span all conceivable choices.
Unlike the mathematician, however, the economist may not simply
present the entire range of logical possibilities and leave it at that.
For one thing, the logical range encompasses an infinity of discrete
possibilities—negative discount rates, and positive rates to infinity;
unbounded ranges of parameter values; a large or infinite variety of
model specifications; and so on. Instead, the economist must judge
which are the economically meaningful alternatives, and consider the
implications of them in their constrained variety. The economist ought
also to see whether there are general conclusions that may be drawn
from the meaningful set of alternatives as a whole.
Few economists or policy makers would agree with Frank Ramsey
that any discount rate above zero simply shows a want of imagination.
On the other hand, few or no economists would suggest that the public
discount rate should be higher than the real private discount rate for
projects with the same risk. These considerations should provide
agreed-upon boundaries for the appropriate discount rate.
These are some specific findings:
1. In all sets of runs, higher population growth has a higher pres-
ent value at a zero or low rate of discount, and up to quite substantial
discount rates—5% at a minimum—even with parameters that are unreason-
ably unfavorable to this outcome. This finding may be contrasted with
the conclusion of main-stream growth theory that lower population growth
is better across the board, and even that negative population growth
-24-
is better than population stationarity. This suggests that
—
putting
aside both the other positive and negative effects of population growth
such as transfer payments to retirees, environmental adjustment costs,
public child services and the like—higher population growth is a good
thing in the MDC world, given the value judgments about the discount
rate that are implicit in our other social decisions.
2. In all sets of runs with functions that are theoretically
reasonable, higher population growth rates have lower present values
at some rate of discount—starting somewhere between 5% and 10%.
But no matter how high the discount rate, lower population growth's
advantage over higher population growth is somewhere between negligible
and non-existent. This is because the consumption advantage due to less
capital dilution that lower population growth yields in the early years
is a very slight advantage at best. This implies that there is no mean-
ingful risk argument against higher population growth, in the context
of this model.
3. Together, the advantage of higher population growth at low
discount rates, and its non-disadvantage at high discount rates, sug-
gests that a strategy of higher population growth dominates a strategy
of lower population growth.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Population policy discussions have been influenced by conventional
steady-state growth theory in which technical progress is exogenous, im-
plying that faster population growth causes a lower rate of consumption.
Making technical progress endogenous in the manner of Verdoorn, Kaldor,
Arrow, or Phelps, however, is shown to lead to the opposite implication,
-25-
that higher population growth causes a higher rate of growth of consump-
tion, though this inference has not been drawn by the authors of these
models.
Steady-state equilibrium analysis is not appropriate for policy deci-
sions, though, because when a nation chooses one or another population
growth rate, it begins with the same endowment of capital and people and
techniques no matter what the population growth rate chosen. Therefore
the appropriate analysis is one which compares the result of two or more
growth rates beginning from that initial position. And the logical
decision criterion is a present-value comparison of per-capita consump-
tion streams.
The paper analyzes the supply and demand of knowledge, and on those
considerations derives the most plausible technical progress functions,
which turn out to be mostly variations on a function of Phelps. The
effects of various rates of population growth are then simulated with
these variations specification and parameters.
The chief result is that with virtually every variant, faster popu-
lation growth shows better consumption results with discount rates up
to 5-10%, a level which is far above the long-run adjusted riskless rate;
at higher discount rates lower (or negative) population growth rates
have higher present values. If pensions were brought into the analysis,
a la Modigliani, Tobin, and Samuelson, higher population growth rates
would seem even more beneficial at low discount rates, and would have
an advantage over lower population growth rates at discount rates even
higher than 6-10%. And even at very high discount rates, lower popula-
tion growth rates imply present values only a bit above those for higher
-26-
population growth rates. The advantage is overwhelmingly with higher
population growth in this growth-theoretic analysis.
-27-
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Notes
We required the firms to be listed during the entire sample
period. The Center for Security Price Research (CRSP) monthly tape
was used to select NYSE listed firms. A firm was considered listed
if it had monthly stock returns available for the entire sample period.
2
The absolute percentage error is computed as the average of
Actual EPS - Predicted EPS
Since this error metric can be explosive
Actual EPS c
when the denominator approaches zero we truncated errors in excess of
ten to a value of ten. This operation was done for a very small percent-
age of the cases.




